Ms.
Pam Jarnecke
Bureau
of Land Management
Battle
Mountain Field Office
Sent
VIA Certified Mail Number
Re:
Dear
Ms. Jarnecke:
Thank
you for this opportunity to review the final EIS for this document. We are very disappointed that the BLM did not
take the advice of the EPA and redo the draft EIS. The DEIS had been an extremely poorly written
document that raised more questions than it answered. In over seven years of reviewing NEPA
documents, I have never reviewed a worse analysis. If our concerns are not considered, we
strongly second the EPA’s motion in their letter to refer this project to the Council on Environmental Quality. This comment letter is postmarked by
Especially
since the BLM and Newmont essentially ignored them, all comments we provided on
the DEIS are reiterated and incorporated here by reference. Some of those comments and the BLM’s
responses are discussed herein. This
letter also includes additional concerns that have come to light since the
DEIS.
As
proposed, this project will cause undue or unnecessary degradation to public
lands. Among many things, this project
will pollute groundwater and surface water and likely render the site to be
listed for Superfund National Priority Listing.
It will illegally dry streams. It
causes substantial toxicological threats to wildlife. And it grossly underestimates the needed
reclamation bond and trust fund. These
items, and more will be discussed in detail below.
Based
on our review of the FEIS, the BLM has ignored comments from both the public
and their sister agencies. The EPA
requested a revised draft because the document was insufficient. The BLM refused by just stating that they
disagree with the BLM’s analysis.
Our
main concern with this site is that it be cleaned up and not turn into a
Superfund clean-up site as both we and the EPA indicated in comment letters.
The BLM has been selling this project as a remining project. It is not.
Moving a billion tons of rock and deepening pits by hundreds of feet is
not necessary to clean the project.
However, we are not opposed to a mine at this site if Newmont is able to
mine while cleaning the site with a guarantee
that they will not make it worse. But,
the EPA was correct, however, in arguing that Newmont is responsible for
cleaning the site whether they mine or not.
Both EPA and GBMW questioned whether the proposal was too large.
EPA believes that
BMG/Newmont is responsible for cleaning up contaminated groundwater or surface
water resulting from the existing project independent
of the proposed project; and that a massive expansion of the project, which
would degrade water quality further, is not
justified simply because current permits do not require BMG to conduct proper
closure and/or post-closure activities at the existing mine. Comment 1-7, EPA DEIS letter at 5, emphases
in original.
Our conclusion after reading the FEIS is that
this project as proposed unacceptably degrades the groundwater and depletes the
surface of the site. The only alternative that will present
acceptable environmental risk is one that provides for complete clean-up of existing contamination and that prevents water from reaching any of the
sulfidic waste rock that will be produced by the project, either in a
backfilled pit or in a waste rock dump.
The waste rock must be effectively sealed from water. Otherwise, the project will cause unnecessary
or undue degradation and the BLM will be violating its own 3809 regulations by
allowing it.
Newmont as a
parent company is responsible for the activities of
The BLM states that Newmont owns BMG as a
wholly owned subsidiary and that they do not anticipate that the merger will
affect the potential environmental impacts of the project. FEIs at i.
This will be true only if Newmont takes responsibility for BMG’s
actions. If they hide behind the
corporate veil such that only BMG is liable for the bond, then there is a
significant potential problem. In other
words, Newmont must assume responsibility for the clean-up needed at the
site. Because Great Basin Mine Watch,
and the EPA, believe that Newmont can not clean this site and operate the mine
profitably and that the site will eventually be added to the National Priority
List under the Superfund program, it is essential to document the degree of
control that Newmont has over BMG.
The Supreme Court recently considered the
liability of parent corporations for the damages caused by their subsidiaries
at sites that received Superfund cleanup.
See
Newmont has made it obvious to its investors
and the world that it intends to actively control BMG:
On January 10, 2001, Newmont
completed a merger with Battle Mountain Gold Company pursuant to an agreement
and plan of merger, dated June 21, 2000, under which each share of common stock
of Battle Mountain and each exchangeable share of Battle Mountain Canada Ltd.
(a wholly-owned subsidiary of Battle Mountain) was converted into the right to
receive 0.105 share of NMC, or approximately 24.1 million shares. Newmont also exchanged 2.3 million shares of
newly issued $3.25 convertible preferred stock for all outstanding shares of
Once again, for the record, Newmont is the operator
of the Phoenix Project and will be liable for any costs that may be incurred in
the future under Superfund liability.
Newmont recently acquired two new mining
companies,
Reclamation
This section addresses reclamation as
proposed by Newmont and the BLM for this project. The comments herein are supplemented by the
technical review performed by Mr. Jim Kuipers.
His technical comments which expand on these statements are attached to
this letter and should be considered to be wholly incorporated into this
comment letter. The reclamation plan and
bonding calculations are not up to industry standards or even BLM standards as
applied in other states for sites with significant AMD potential. Mr. Kuipers notes that “[i]t is significant
that up to the present time acid drainage has literally not been recognized or
accounted for in reclamation and closure planning by the responsible state and
federal regulatory agencies in Nevada.”.
The plan should be modified to recognize the
following requirements: At least 18
inches of suitable growth medium (salvaged topsoil to the greatest extent
possible), including having the desired texture (density, coarse fragments and
clay contents), organic matter, moisture retention, fertility, and pH
characteristics adequate to propagate sustainable vegetation. The plan is conspicuous in its lack of
salvage of topsoil. Other re-vegetation
factors that also must be assessed include re-vegetation through time, slope
and aspect, competition, weedy species and undesirable invader plants, and
plant cover. All these aspects should be
included in the design and monitoring plan for the revegetation test plots and
additional variables such as alternative cover designs and thickness, materials
of construction, and revegetation approaches should also be evaluated.
The underlying assumption of the cost
estimate for revegetation should consider the likelihood that successful
revegetation will require a sustained rather than one time effort as depicted
in the reclamation plan. Experience has
shown that multiple plantings of at least some areas is to be expected due to
climatic, insect and other factors, and that fertilization over an extended
time period is typically necessary, particularly where mined rock is to be
substituted for a more suitable growth medium.
The need to eliminate infiltration into the
acid-generating waste rock dumps, leach piles and tailing facilities, as well
as the backfilled open pit, along with the type of vegetative treatment planned
for reclamation, should dictate soil replacement depth. In order to reduce infiltration to the
greatest extent practical, a water balance cover (in which plants transpire
water and the soil prevents water infiltration to underlying mine waste), or a
water barrier cover (in which an impermeable water barrier to prevent water
infiltration) should be specified for all potentially acid-generating
areas. The engineered cap should be
designed so as to optimize desirable characteristics and achieve minimize
infiltration to underlying acid generating waste while maximizing revegetation
so as to increase evapotranspiration.
The FEIS has not adequately addressed
tailings facility fluid management from the existing mine, proposed project, or
post-reclamation standpoint, and it has not been recognized in corresponding
financial assurance determinations. The
proposed plan should be modified to assume the most likely scenario of fluid
management as being active management including capture and treatment due to
the acid drainage generating nature of the tailings, the potential cost of
which should also be included in the financial assurance determination.
The FEIS has not adequately addressed
long-term heap leach fluid management and it has not been recognized in
corresponding financial assurance determinations. The proposed plan should be modified to
assume the most likely scenario to fluid management as being active management
including capture and treatment due to the acid drainage generating nature of
the heap leach materials, the potential cost of which should also be included
in the financial assurance determination.
The proposed plan does not address acid
drainage that will likely result from the tailings facility and heap leach
areas, as well as from the open pits and other areas. It similarly does not address ground water
contamination that is presently and in the future will continue to emanate from
the existing tailings facilities. These
features make it obvious that there is an immediately existing as well as
future need to conduct water management activities at the site that should be
included in the reclamation and closure planning. The requirements in this regard are likely to
result in significant financial assurance requirements.
Financial
Assurance
There are two aspects of financial assurance
for this project. One is the reclamation
bond which allows for site closure should Newmont go bankrupt. The second is the trust fund designed to
monitor and mitigate long-term water quality problems likely to occur at the
site. Initially, we object very strongly to the BLM’s refusal to provide a copy of
the Long-Term Contingency Fund. That
refusal was illegal in that it violated CEQ regulations that require that all
referenced material in NEPA documents be available for public inspection. “No material may be incorporated by reference
unless it is reasonably available for inspection by potentially interested
persons within the time allowed for comment. Material based on proprietary data
which is itself not available for review and comment shall not be incorporated
by reference.” 40CFR1502.21. The BLM clearly referenced the document and
then refused to make it available in violation of this regulation. The refusal also violates the statement made
by the BLM to the EPA in response to their concerns about this issue.
The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (USEPA) and the public may review this financial information
in the Phoenix Project Plan of Operations and all associated documents.
Specifically, the Reclamation Plan (Section 6 of the Pan of Operations)
and the Phoenix Project Long-term
Contingency Fund (Battle Mountain Gold 2001) discuss funding for
reclamation and closure and postclosure monitoring and mitigation at the
site. Response to Comment 1-3, FEIS,
emphases added.
This clearly states that the public would be
allowed to review the Long-term Contingency Fund. We clearly reserve the right to review this
document and appeal its contents to the Interior Board of Land Appeals and
federal court. And we wonder whether the
BLM intended to lie to the public or whether it was accidental.
Reclamation
Bond: The reclamation bond must include sufficient
amounts to fully clean the site should BMG/Newmont go bankrupt at any
time. The plan includes backfill to
prevent the formation of pit lakes; the financial assurance must include
estimates for backfilling should bankruptcy occur at any time.
The FEIS (p. 2-48) provides
an estimate for reclamation and fluid management of approximately $32,073,000
for the first 3-year phase of the proposed operation. The maximum forecasted reclamation cost
estimate for the project during any phase is approximately $55,800,000 during
years 21-23 of operation. As experience
has shown at several mine sites including at the Zortman and Landusky, and
Golden Sunlight mines, both of which are regulated by Montana BLM, the presence
of acid generation can significantly impact financial assurance
requirements. AMD has resulted in an
increase of approximately an order of magnitude to pay for surface reclamation
and water treatment associated mitigation, and has raised the typical cost of
reclamation and closure from an aggregated $5,000 - $15,000 per acre, to in excess
of $50,000 to $100,000 or more per acre.
The Golden Sunlight Mine in
The Zortman-Landusky Mine is
another significant case in point with respect to bonding. Despite the existence of significant bonding
of approximately $72 million when its owner Pegasus Gold went bankrupt, the BLM
and Montana DEQ have recently identified a need for an additional $33 million
to address a shortfall for surface reclamation and water treatment in
perpetuity for their preferred alternative.
The primary factors attributable to the financial assurance shortfall
were an underestimate of the acid drainage generation at the site and a
corresponding need for additional surface reclamation and water treatment
capacity and long-term financial assurance.
In our opinion and as discussed throughout this comment set and the
comment set on the DEIS, and in the FEIS itself, this site is as contaminated
as these other sites.
Our review of the Phoenix
Project financial assurance estimate shows that it has been appropriately
performed as a first order engineering cost estimate. Cost estimates for wages (Davis-Bacon),
equipment costs (hourly rental costs from vendors), and adjusted unit costs are
consistent with our experience and recommendations and the revised 3809 Surface
Mining Regulations (effective January 2001).
We noted the following inconsistencies with recommended practice in the
Phoenix Project cost estimate.
Direct Costs: The direct costs in the reclamation cost
estimate are for the proposed plan. The
previous sections comments on reclamation and closure identified deficiencies
in the proposed plan with respect to cover design and materials, revegetation,
and water treatment for existing as well as future ground water remediation.
Based on experience at other
sites where reclamation and closure of similar mine sites having acid drainage
has taken place, including those cited elsewhere in these comments, direct
capital costs for surface reclamation and water management will most likely be
higher than estimated for the proposed plan.
Engineered covers designed to minimize infiltration are likely to
require either modified or different material characteristics, and it is likely
that a more desirable growth medium for revegetation can be located in close
proximity to the site. The inadequacy of
the proposed cap has been discussed in detail elsewhere. Adequate revegetation establishment to
promote evapotranspiration will likely require more intensive and longer-term
effort than suggested by the proposed plan.
Capital requirements for water management including capture, conveyance,
storage, treatment and discharge will most likely significantly exceed the estimated
requirements in the proposed plan, both in terms of quantity of flow treated as
well as load of acid and dissolved contaminants.
It is not possible to make
an accurate estimate as to the actual required tasks and corresponding costs
for reclamation and closure at the Phoenix Project site given the inadequacy of
the information in the FEIS. The FEIS is
based upon a largely conceptual reclamation and closure plan that assumes a low
to moderate level of activity and cost associated with acid generation. However, cost estimates for comparable sites
that are based on adequate information and identify and address acid generation
are more complex in their treatment of the problem and have a significantly
higher unit and total cost than in the cost estimate for the proposed
plan. Based on an average total unit
cost of $75,000 per acre for reclamation at similar projects (see projects
cited elsewhere in these comments and as provided in the Appendix) versus the
$14,452 per acre in the cost estimate for the proposed plan, a shortfall of
approximately $60,000 per acre or more than $100 million total may exist for
the proposed bond amount.
The existence of this
discrepancy in the financial assurance amount, given the similarity of the
Phoenix Project’s characteristics to other mine sites where plans have been
established that adequately deal with acid drainage and associated issues,
supports the recommendation that a more extensive and immediate assessment of
existing contamination and reclamation and closure requirements and associated
financial liability be conducted by the responsible agencies, with assistance
from the EPA and other knowledgeable agencies.
If any future mining takes place, it should be assessed from the
standpoint of potentially aggravating a significant existing problem, and it
similarly should be more adequately addressed before approval is given in order
to ensure an adequate reclamation and closure plan and financial assurance.
Indirect Costs: The
calculations inappropriately accounted for indirect costs including cost
escalation and administrative costs. The
financial assurance estimate provided by the project proponent is based on a
lump sum of costs in 2001 dollars.
Actual reclamation would take at least three to five years or more in
which event the bond, which would be paid out as reclamation occurs unless
otherwise specified, would not keep up with inflation and other factors. It is standard practice to establish a
reclamation schedule (see Golden Sunlight Bond Calculations in Appendix) and
include cost escalation in order to determine the NPV of the financial
assurance instrument for the year of its establishment. A
correction should be made to account for both escalation since the 2001 cost
estimate was performed as well as future cost escalation. The typical cost escalation factors used are
3.0% per year or as estimated by the Means Heavy Construction Costing Index
(approximately 3.3% average per year over last ten years).
The Office of Surface Mining
(OSM) has established long-standing costs associated with administrative
overheads of agency operated reclamation and closure activities. The OSM guidelines identify mobilization and
demobilization, contingencies, engineering redesign, contractor profit and
overhead, and reclamation management fees as indirect cost categories. In addition individual states must include
applicable insurance, tax and contractor bonding requirements. The cost estimate for the proposed plan
includes mobilization and demobilization at 5%, contingencies at 6%, no
allowance for engineering redesign, contractor profit and overhead at 10%, and
BLM administration at 10%. In addition,
Insurance (1.5% of labor) and performance and payment bonds (3%) were included. The
contractor overhead and profit should be corrected to 20% to reflect typical
costs related to government contracting procedures, and an allowance of at
least 5% should be made for engineering redesign. This would result in an increase in indirect
costs of approximately 15% over that contained in the cost estimate for the
proposed plan.
The final cost estimate
provided by Mr. Kuipers is that the bond must be at least $27,000,000 more than
currently estimated. This would be
approximately $58,000,000 before the project may commence.
The three-year financial
assurance review needs to do more than adjust for additional area and cost
escalation. It should also be reviewed
with respect to potential changes in site aspect or characterization and the
reclamation and closure plan modified as necessary to mitigate future
occurrences with corresponding changes made to the financial assurance
estimate. It should consider additional
clean-up requirements as evidenced by changing groundwater quality conditions. As pits are constructed, the costs of backfilling
and liming that backfilling must be included[2].
Long-term Surety: Newmont
will be required to establish a trust fund for treatment of groundwater
pollution in the future. The assumptions
used in the proposed plan assumes short-term and long-term water management
requirements for up to and beyond 130 years and greater than 1000 years, but in
all cases requiring eventual groundwater capture and treatment at some point in
the future for an extended period of time.
However, it would be erroneous to base the actual long-term water
management costs on the estimates contained in the FEIS as it also states (p.
3.2-55) it is important to note that
there is considerable uncertainty associated with long-term predictions of
potential impacts to ground water quality resulting from infiltration through
the waste rock facilities. We
discuss reasons for this uncertainty in detail at other parts of this letter.
Funding for perpetual
treatment has been dealt with in a consistent matter at other sites in other
states, including those where BLM was responsible, by requiring the financial
assurance estimate to assume that all existing and eventual water treatment
facilities were available either during or immediately post-mining and
reclamation. This is reflected in the
cost estimates for the Golden Sunlight Mine and Molycorp Questa Mine
reclamation and closure plans (attached to Jim Kuipers technical comments).
Using industry standard
interest rates (3% inflation and 6% return on investment), Mr. Kuipers recalculated
the present value of the contingency fund to be $9.1 million. Because of the uncertainty in the
calculations that will likely lead to significantly more contamination and
treatment being needed much sooner, Mr. Kuipers calculated that $47.3 million
should be placed in the trust fund today.
Kuipers’ calculations, which are attached to this letter, demonstrates
the significant shortfall of the proposed long-term financial assurance based
on the assumptions of the proposed plan, as well as the even greater shortfall
which might occur due to reasonably expected acid drainage characteristics. These figures highlight the gross inadequacy of the proposed financial
assurance amount as well as the factors which have been used to calculate
the amount. It is recommended that the
amount of financial assurance in the form of a trust fund for water treatment
in perpetuity be calculated to include existing and future water treatment
needs in the present and assumed to be necessary immediately following mining and
reclamation, and that those calculations be based on conservative rather than
best case scenarios.
Bonding for No-Action: Currently, the site is not being mined. The existing Reona project calls for mining
for another six months, but that “would depend upon economic conditions”. FEIS at ii.
Federal mining regulations require that reclamation begin at sites after
mining has ceased for ____ months.
Because we doubt that Newmont/BMG can actually afford to mine this
project under current economic conditions, we
request that the BLM require reclamation to begin immediately if mining does
not begin. The FEIS also correctly
states that for the No Action alternative, “the existing facilities identified
in Section 2.2 would be closed and reclaimed in accordance with current permits
and applicable federal and state closure and reclamation requirements”. FEIS at 2-7.
Unfortunately, the current reclamation plan would allow the existing
pits to “be left in their final mining configuration”. It appears that the current reclamation plan
would violate state law because it does not protect waters of the state. The analysis of the pit lakes formed for the
No Action alternative indicates that downgradient groundwater would be degraded
by a pit lake in the existing Fortitude Pit.
The pit lake model indicates that the pit lake would have “some
constituents exceeding secondary drinking water quality standards” and that
there would be “an outflow of pit lake water to downgradient groundwater”. FEIS at 3.2-74.
Also, we request that the
BLM immediately recalculate the bond required for the Reona Project, which,
because of Newmont’s liability for full site clean-up, is essentially a bond
needed for the No Action alternative as amended to include adequate clean-up. Even for the No Action alternative, there
may acidic water in the Minnie Pit. “If
water does pond in the Minnie Pit, it would likely be acidic with some elevated
metals concentrations...”. FEIS at
3.2-76. The BLM’s assertion that the
“spontaneous drainage of this pit indicates” the pit would likely “remain dry
in the future” is unfounded. Id. As discussed elsewhere, the groundwater level
in the area changes substantially and frequently and the pit would likely have
water at least occasionally. If the pit
lake water is bad, its drainage will also degrade waters of the state. Therefore, it is essential that even under No
Action, backfill of this pit must include lime.
Therefore, it is essential to calculate a new bond for the existing
condition to assure that Newmont actually fulfills its obligations to clean up
the existing site.
The BLM has argued that
bonding for pit backfilling was not needed in the initial estimate. On the DEIS, we commented that the
reclamation bond was insufficient because it only applied to backfilling Minnie
Pit. Comment 13-38. BLM’s response was that life-of-mine bonding
was not necessary because the backfilling is only to “optimize materials handling”. Because this pit will have significant water
quality problems, backfilling and liming the Minnie Pit must be included in the
initial bond calculations.
Water Resources
There are few places in the
western United States where an active mine is so badly polluted as this
site. Even though the BLM documented
this pollution in the DEIS, the BLM downplayed our comment regarding the
current extent of pollution at the site.
Comment 13-4. It must be the
change in political leadership, but the BLM appears to now deny the pollution
that exists at the site. While the DEIS
outlined many exceedences, in response to our noting of this fact, the BLM
provided a previously ignored opinion that “pre-mining concentrations ...
probably naturally exceeded current water quality standards”. There may be some truth that the groundwater
has naturally high constituent levels, but the current concentrations
essentially qualify the site for Superfund status which is not natural. Interestingly, the EPA agrees with us. See comment 1-1.
We suggested that the BLM
consider a project that had shallower pits because the technical waste rock
report stated that acid generating potential increases with depth. Comment 13-6.
In their response, the BLM ignores the technical report by stating that
because the faults which control sulfide placement are vertical, a shallower
project will not encounter less sulfide.
Why did the BLM ignore the waste rock report which indicated more
sulfidization with depth?
Also, we requested that the
information in Exponent Tables 7-1 and 7-2 be included in the EIS because it shows
the long-term release of sulfate to the groundwater under the waste rock dumps,
including backfilled open pits. Comment
13-7. The response is that it was left
out of the DEIS because the BLM considered the predictions to be extremely
conservative because the modeling was based on an assumption that all of the
sulfide would oxidize and all of the resultant sulfate would be released to
groundwater. Unfortunately for the BLM’s
assumption the model is conservative, Exponent stated that the model has three
major components: “1)the oxidation of sulfide minerals in the waste rock
produces a source of solutes, 2) chemical reactions between acidic pore waters
and waste rock can attenuate the migration of some solutes, and 3)eventually,
it is assumed that non-attenuated solutes are carried to the water table by
meteoric water percolating through the waste rock.” Exponent, page 47. This is not conservative, it is just a model
approach. “After exhausting the
neutralizing potential, sulfate produced by oxidation is assumed to move
conservatively to the water table dissolved in the pore water, and loading will
then decrease at a rate corresponding to the decrease in the sulfide oxidation
rate; loading will cease when all the sulfide has been oxidized.” Exponent, page 47 and 48. These quotes from a longer discussion show
that both the neutralizing capacity of the waste rock and the attenuation in
underlying rock has been considered.
We also pointed out in our
comments various physical realities that will likely increase the speed with
which the sulfate will reach the groundwater.
Comment 13-8. The BLM chose to
downplay all of these realities by just saying that Exponent used reasonable
estimates. But Exponent did not test the
sensitivity of their model to the uncertainty in their assumptions as any good
modeler would do and the BLM did not request sensitivity analysis as any good
reviewer would do. In their classic text
on groundwater modeling, Anderson and Woessner wrote “[t]he purpose of a
sensitivity analysis is to quantify the uncertainty in the calibrated model
caused by uncertainty in the estimates of aquifer parameters, stress, and
boundary conditions.”[3] They go on to state:
Not only do we have
uncertainty as to the parameter values needed for our design calculations, we
even have uncertainty about the very geometry of the system we are trying to
analyze. The uncertainties of lithology,
stratigraphy, and structure introduce a level of complexity to geotechnical and
hydrogeological analysis that is completely unknown in other engineering
disciplines.[4]
While referring to saturated
flow modeling, the principle of uncertainty clearly applies to flow modeling
through the waste rock dumps. Clearly,
the BLM should require Exponent to test the sensitivity of their model with
respect to parameters such as rooting depth and plant density. Failure to do so means the BLM will fail to
consider the uncertainty of the predictions.
For example, if the infiltration rate through the cap is just a little
higher than predicted, it is likely that sulfate will reach the groundwater
much quicker than predicted. Without
knowing the sensitivity of the model, the BLM has no basis for assuming the
predictions are conservative.
Modeling of Flow through Waste Rock: We
also raised questions about the quality of one-dimensional modeling. Comments 13-11 and 12. The BLM’s response to 13-11 directed us to
several excellent figures of moisture content with depth in existing waste rock
dumps. The BLM’s interpretation of the
figures appears correct, but only if the
assumption is made in advance to do one dimensional modeling. In other words, the data has been interpreted
to fit the chosen model rather than being analyzed with the idea of choosing
the appropriate model. For example,
Figure A9-1c does show a general average moisture content of 4.5% at the
surface dropping to about 1.5% at 50 feet as suggested by the BLM’s
response. However, one of the profiles
shows a peak of 8% at about 40 feet (UFOISA-DH1) and another (NEOISA-DH2) shows
a peak of 6% at about 35 feet. This
indicates slugs of water moving through the waste rock at different rates
dependent on the location within the waste rock dump. Other profiles show spikes which indicate
slugs of water at different locations in the waste rock. The line for CUOISA-DH1 shows a wetting
front, but it is not distinct. And, it
trends toward very low values at depth. This
suggests that some water gets out in front of the wetting front, which is
common in unsaturated flow. In other
words, if the wetting front model were accurate, the moisture content below the
front would be relatively constant.
Instead, the figure suggests water moves downward at differing rates
depending on the size and connectivity of pores. This points to the need for three-dimensional
modeling and the conclusion that the wetting fronts shown in Figures in other
reports associated with this document are at best rough guess of where the
water will be.
The response to 13-12
further indicates the need for three-dimensional modeling. “Visual observations at this and other mines
indicate that end-dumped waste rock facilities are typically heterogeneous and
anisotropic, containing sloping layers of coarser and finer material.” Response 13-12. Treating this heterogeneous and anisotropic
material as one-dimensional violates the assumptions of the models, namely that
the material at least be heterogeneous.
We agree with the BLM that parameterizing a 3-d model of a waste rock dump
would be difficult. Data is available
only where bore holes have been drilled.
For waste rock dumps yet to be constructed, it is only possible to
consider existing data at other sites. A
desirable model for such a situation would likely employ stochastic simulation
wherein the waste rock layers are divided into cells and the properties of each
cell are entered as a frequency distribution.
The output from the model may still be a wetting front, but it will have
a confidence band around it. Instead of
predicting it will take 130 years to reach the groundwater, it is probable that
there is a chance that some water will reach the groundwater in just a few
years. With this kind of modeling, it
would be possible to account for the uncertainty in the modeling.
The climatology input to the
model is also incorrect. Specifically,
the 100-year rainfall is wrong (comment 13-13) and the scaling of the
precipitation amount to higher elevations is incorrect (comment 13-14). The BLM’s responses merely talk around the
comments ignoring the comment’s substance.
While acknowledging the data showing that observed 24-hour precipitation
values at nearby cities exceeds the 100-year estimate for Battle Mountain, they
dismiss the concern by saying these values are consistent. The difference of a few tenths of an inch can
be very important because it may result in significant additional amounts of
infiltration. The first inch or so may
just fill a deficit in the cap; additional amounts of precipitation likely add
to the total that seeps through the cap to the waste rock.
Response 13-14 makes no
hydrologic sense. The BLM’s basic
argument is to agree with our comment (“More frequent precipitation in smaller
events would tend to increase relative humidity and decrease evapotranspiration...”),
but to deny it without any quantitative analysis ( “this effect would be
offset, or even exceeded, by the fact that smaller precipitation events would
produce less infiltration). The response
ignores reality. One of the main factors
limiting infiltration is that each precipitation event must fill the water
deficit in the cap before seepage begins.
More frequent events keep the cap wetter; more of the larger events will
actually seep into the waste rock. And
at higher elevations, this project spans 2000 feet, even the BLM realizes that
lower evaporation occurs. FEIS at 3.2-1.
Our comment 13-15 questioned
the use of Battle Mountain solar radiation data at the higher elevations of
this. The BLM responded by saying that
accounting for differences in elevation for precipitation is more
important. This is not correct. With the magnitude of annual evaporation
being near 40 inches while that of precipitation being around 10 inches, small
variations, say 10%, in evaporation have a much large effect on the water
balance of the cap than do similar magnitude variations in precipitation (1
inch). Thus, saying that “infiltration
is much less sensitive to these parameters than to precipitation” is just plain
wrong. To prove it, a sensitivity
analysis of the model should be run.
Response 13-16 again shows a
lack of understanding of the process. We
pointed out that the bedrock underlying the waste rock, or more specifically,
the colluvium which underlies the waste rock, should be analyzed as a fractured
media. When considering it as a
homogeneous bulk, the hydraulic conductivity, whether saturated or not, is very
low, typically, and in this case, on the order of feet per year. Assuming such homogeneity results in
predictions that flow through the bedrock will take years to reach the
groundwater. In reality, when the
bedrock underlies a media, such as colluvium or waste rock, that has a
hydraulic conductivity orders of magnitude greater than the bedrock, the
bedrock acts as a dam. Water will
literally pond on the surface reaching saturation relatively rapidly. Once saturation is reached, the water will
being to flow into the cracks or fractures.
(Capillary tension prevents the water from flowing from small pores into
large fractures prior to reaching atmospheric pressure.) Flow through fractures would literally be at
rates of feet per hour. In fractured
rock, most of the flow is through the fractures. Because the area of the fractures is very
small as a function of the overall area of the bedrock, possibly covering less
than 0.01% of the full cross-sectional area, the average (Darcy) velocity will
be very small while the actual velocity (the rate the water flows through the
actual pores) will be quite high. Water,
and contaminants, will reach the groundwater long before the average velocity
would have predicted. This is what is
wrong with this seepage analysis.
In summary for the seepage
analysis through waste rock, all of the comments raised by Great Basin Mine
Watch suggest that flow to the groundwater will be much faster than determined
by the BLM. The fact that this pollution
will occur much quicker than predicted changes the numbers used in the trust
fund calculations as well as the reclamation plan. See the discussion above regarding the
funding of trust. Hydrologic science
indicates that the BLM is grossly ill-prepared to clean up the site should
Newmont fail to do so and that Newmont is grossly underestimating the time
until their liability begins.
Groundwater Levels: Figure 3.2-9 shows groundwater levels based on the wells show in
Figure 3.2-8. The level map shows
contours in the upper elevations where there are no wells. The document should have noted that there are
no measurements of groundwater levels at high elevations. Usually, springs are places where the groundwater
level intersects the ground surface.
More importantly, the
document fails to consider the screening levels of the wells in Figure
3.2-8. The discussion fails to note
whether artesian pressure has been observed.
It was observed during mine exploration in 1999 and 2000 and was used as
an explanation for changing water levels in pits.
Pit Backfilling: The FEIS fails to provide any
additional information concerning the prevention of acid mine drainage from the
waste rock to be backfilled into pit lakes.
BMG/Newmont will rely on submergence and added lime to prevent AMD. However, the document does not specify how
much lime will be needed. Because this
is likely to be an extremely large amount, it is essential that the FEIS
discuss this because it may not even be available at a cost that will allow the
mine to be profitably completed. There may not be enough lime available from
existing sources in the region. The
BLM needs to verify the amount and show that it can actually be obtained. It must also be included in the reclamation
bond calculations (see the section on reclamation bonding above.)
One of our primary concerns
is that the groundwater levels rise and fall substantially in the backfilled
pits and that this will allow oxygen to reach deep into the waste rock. We raised this in comment 13-24. The BLM relies on an analysis that the
observed water level changes was caused by mine exploration. First, our comment stated that the reports
show a system “controlled by the annual amounts and seasonal distribution of
recharge”, but the BLM apparently felt we said the entire 160 foot variation at
some wells was dependent on seasonal recharge.
Comment 13-24. Our statement
clearly indicated annual variation as well.
The figures referenced by BLM (Figures 2-4A, 2-4B, and 2-4C in Baker)
show significant declines over a several year period (trends) for wells CM35
(80 ft), CM38 (25 ft), CM41 (20 ft), CM53 (70 ft), CM30 (80 ft), CM40c (120
ft), CM41 (20 ft), CM44(130 ft), CM45 (100 ft), CP05 (160 ft) and CP06 (160
ft). The majority, but not all, of the
decline occurred during 1999. In fact,
the two wells cited by BLM with the largest decrease (CP05 and CP06) actually
increased during preceding years by as much as 40 feet before commencing their
decline. The BLM ignored this
increase. Comparison of Figures 2-4A, B
and C with Figure 1-2A in Baker (the location map) shows that the monitoring
wells in the mountains fluctuated significantly and the wells on the flats
south of the mine site remained relatively constant. This would be expected as the lower elevation
wells likely tap a regional aquifer into which smaller aquifers upgradient
drain. The further from the recharge zone,
the more the water levels flatten out.
Unfortunately, Baker did not provide hydrographs of all the wells on
Figure 1-2A which raises questions about their selection of wells.
There are many reasons to
doubt Baker’s explanation for the groundwater decline between the North and
South Midas pits. A 160 foot decline
over a 3/4 mile long and an estimated 1/4 wide region is 192 acre-feet (120 ac
x160 ft x 0.01). This is the approximate
area of the coalescing drawdown around the two drawdown centers. Baker at 2-18. The storage coefficient is based on standard
values for unconfined bedrock aquifers.
The calculation ignores the sloping sides of a drawdown cone. Based on FEIS Table 3.2-17, this is at least
10% of the recharge in the entire basin.
The amounts measured by Baker emanating from exploration holes are only
about 30% of this amount. Baker page
2-16. If the water levels fell because
of exploration activities as described, there should have been concomitant
rises in levels some where else.
Baker argues that the drill
holes shown on Baker Figure 2-11 intercepted recharge flowing to monitoring
wells CP05 and CP06 thereby explaining the level drop. This would be an acceptable explanation if
these wells produced an amount corresponding with the volume of the cone of
depression and if the exploration wells were actually upgradient from the
monitoring wells. There also is no
explanation of the increase in levels observed before the drop. They are not upgradient as much as they are
both on the eastern side slope of Copper Canyon. While faults and fractures make the flow very
complicated, it seems unlikely that these exploration wells could have
intercepted flow heading toward these monitoring wells.
Baker’s explanation that
boreholes drilled “across the low permeability fault south of the South Midas
Pit” may allow “leakage” that “provide[s] a continuing stress to the faulted
and fractured bedrock system allowing ground water to leave the fractured
aquifer and flow into the overlying alluvium” would be believable if there was
evidence that flow was accumulating in the alluvium. Baker at 2-17, 18. There is no such evidence.
The BLM is incorrect to say
that it is inappropriate to compare Sleeper with this site. Comment 13-25. It is an example where a similar plan,
submerging sulfidic rock with water, failed to work as quickly as planned. Another difference is that the company in
that case had failed to predict the pit lake would be acidic. It is conceivable that Newmont should do the
same with one or more of the pit lakes that could form if backfilling is not
completed.
The FEIS relies on pit
backfilling without guaranteeing that backfill will not bury additional mineral
resources. Newmont has conducted
condemnation drilling of beneficiation site facilities, but there is no discussion
of requiring similar drilling before pits are backfilled. FEIS at 2-47.
The BLM fails to explain how
they will maintain security in the pits, in perpetuity. Is there funding provided to maintain the
proposed berms and warning signs? FEIS
at 2-46
Surface Discharge: There is no explanation to our
concern about the discharge of stormwater to surface drainages. Comment 13-27. In our comment, we mentioned that the EIS
calls for discharging water to a point.
The BLM has not identified that point or otherwise addressed concerns
about whether that point drains into Iron Canyon or other ephemeral or
intermittent drainage. The BLM
completely ignored questions about the lining of the retention ponds and the
fact that seepage from those ponds into a surface drainage would constitute an
illegal discharge.
Surface Water: The primary stream of concern to be affected by this project is
Willow Creek. As described in the
FEIS. “[U]pper reaches of Willow Creek
are in contact with the ground water system.
Gains in stream flow occur by net ground water inflow along the reach
extending from the headwaters to a position on the local alluvial fan where it
leaves the mountain front and begins to coalesce with a more extensive fan
system.” FEIS at 3.2-8. This acknowledged the connection and
therefore the dependence of this stream on the groundwater. As we discuss on page 12-13 of our DEIS
comments, it is illegal for the dewater to dry this stream. The BLM claimed that we stretch the
definition of the Clean Water Act and cited the original Clean Water Act. Unfortunately, the BLM did not investigate
the legal citations that used the CWA to prevent stream dewatering.
The BLM’s response to our
comment regarding the degradation of springs and Public Water Reserve No.107 is
incorrect. Comment 13-33. As explained in our comment, neither the
reserve nor the IBLA decision allows for any mitigation by any method other
than avoidance. Thus, all of the
springs listed on Table 3.2-14, regardless of the ownership of water rights,
are potentially protected by this Public Water Reserve.
Long-term Management Plan: Our
comments showed that the long-term management plan is insufficient to protect
the groundwater. The BLM failed to
respond to the specifics of our comment 13-44 which pointed to the leading
groundwater modeling text that stated that using MODFLOW to monitor fracture
flows was a gross simplification of the model.
The fact that Baker was able to calibrate a porous media model to
observed well levels for a fracture system is not surprising for a nonunique
model[5]. Modeling contaminant transport without
considering the fractures or other issues we raised is just wrong. Contaminants will not flow through fractured
systems like they flow through porous systems, the assumption made by using
MODFLOW and discussed at length in our comment 13-44.. Unless there is a well monitoring every
fracture system, the collection system will not collect, or even detect, the
bulk of groundwater contamination. The
fact that MODFLOW has been used to “evaluate potential mine dewatering impacts
to water levels in fractured rocks aquifers (sic) in numerous other mines in
northern Nevada” is irrelevant to this discussion. Those models would not be any more successful
in predicting contaminant pathways than this one[6]. Also, those models all have uniqueness
problems as well. I refer you to any
standard textbook on systems engineering for a discussion on uniqueness and how
it affects modeling. Singh[7] is a
good example for hydrologic modeling.
As noted, we’ve expressed
our concern that it is unlikely that any groundwater retrieval system based
simply on wells will work. We suggested
in comment 13-45 the use of slurry walls and grout curtains. We are and were aware of the difficulties
cited in the BLM’s response that Newmont will encounter in installing these
barriers. Our comment indicated a need
for “prescriptions [to] handle the uncertainties”. Barriers should be used with the well
retrieval system. The barriers will
cut-off fractures and divert the flow so that a larger proportion may be
retrieved by the wells. Ultimately, the
amount of contaminations captured by the system will depend on the quality of
the installation of the system. It may
well be that even with a combined barrier and well system, it may not be
possible to collect enough of the contaminated water. The BLM must complete a detailed assessment
of this, including a reanalysis of the groundwater model, to determine whether
Newmont can actually complete this project.
Perhaps the No Action alternative is the only one that will not degrade
the groundwater.
Additional Review of the Long-term Contingency Plan: Because of the importance
of this aspect of the project and because the BLM relies on the monitoring that
occurs herein, we provide some additional review of the plan.
To be effective, wells must
be placed in all fault and fracture zones.
While the plan’s objectives ignore fracture zones, the report does
allude to the need to place wells in them.
CLGWM at 4 and 5. Apparently,
although it is not described, the authors used their automated MODFLOW
calibration to identify places of high permeability. The problem with this is that the scale of
the fracture zones is much less than the scale of the model cells.
The authors rely on a
five-foot layer of oxide waste rock as a cap over of the waste rock dumps to
neutralize 30% of the acid to be generated.
CLGWM at 8 and 10. Unfortunately,
they do not identify the source of this neutralizing waste rock. Neither does the FEIS. Without specifying where the neutralizing
waste rock will be found, it should not be planned on in the FEIS.
The modeling of contaminant
particle transport has ignored dispersion.
For this reason, the particle tracking codes that utilize MODFLOW “are
not appropriate when it is necessary to compute the first arrival of measurable
contamination”.[8]
An additional poor choice
was to assume that no oxidation occurs in the bedrock beneath the waste
rock. “Because most proposed waste-rock
facilities are underlain by bedrock containing fractures with a low surface
area to volume ratio, it was assumed that no additional attenuation of sulfate
or acidity would be achieved once percolating water from the waste rock enters
the bedrock system.” CLGWM at 9. Without proper documentation, which has not
been provided, this assumption could have huge ramifications. Fracture zones between the waste rock and
the groundwater table could have high area to volume ratios. Zones that have been dewatered could have
experienced oxidation. See Comment 15-6
by Glenn Miller. There could be a
significant increase in acidity as a result of this infiltration. Also, there could be a significant increase
in the leaching of metals from this rock.
Ignoring this without adequate data could be ignoring a large additional
source of contamination.
Additionally, the modeling
assumed that the lime added to open pits is completely successful in preventing
further acidification. Unfortunately,
responses to our comments about the adequacy of the amendments included reference
to the monitoring plan. For example, see
comment and response 13-24[9]. There is no explanation how a monitoring plan
developed assuming there would be no release could actually monitor for such
release.
The technical memorandum
documenting the modeling indicates that existing waste rock on the site has
already been neutralized. “The
predicted sulfate loading to groundwater is based on the assumption that the
amount of acid produced during the brief period of oxidation in the existing
waste rock is less than the neutralization potential of the material. That is, once the old waste rock is covered
with new waste rock and active oxidation stops, pore wastes return to
near-neutral pH, and sulfate concentrations in the ore water in the old waste
rock are limited by the solubility of gypsum”.
At 6. Basically, the argument is
that covering the existing waste rock will stop oxidation and the pH will
become neutral. There is no data or
analysis provided to document this assumption.
Thus, it appears that the modeling may significantly underestimate the
loading.
Figures 1 and 2, showing the
location of extraction wells, somewhat confirms the issues we raised above
concerning the lack of consideration of fracture zones. If fractures were actually considered, the
wells would not have been evenly spaced; few fracture zones are evenly
spaced. There is also no discussion of
the depth or screening levels of the wells.
Most contaminants coming from the pits would be very deep and possibly
in aquifers that are semi-confined and separate from upper layers. Thus, pumping higher layers may not retrieve
contaminants in lower levels.
The discussion in the FEIS
constantly mentions this extraction plan and how it will protect the
groundwater from all problems and the plan itself lays out neatly spaced wells
based on isotropic and homogeneous conditions (in each model cell), allowing
for nicely defined flow paths. In
conclusion, the analysis, modeling and design give this reviewer no confidence
that the groundwater will actually be protected. Newmont and the BLM, by placing all of their
eggs into the monitoring and extraction basket, are establishing a legacy of
pollution in the region that will last for centuries.
Groundwater Model: The BLM at least noted most of our comments on the groundwater model without substantially disagreeing with them. (Comments 13-62 through 13-80). One exception is where we stated that mean error is a poor choice of calibration measures. Comment 13-67. Amazingly, the BLM responded by referring to page 238 of Anderson and Woessner, one of our common references. Unfortunately, the book provides the formula and the following text (on page 240). “The ME is simple to calculate but is usually not a wise choice because both negative and positive differences are incorporated in the mean and may cancel out the error. Hence,